Peer-reviewed
2. Muffling: Communicative Curtailment in Speech Production
forthcoming in MIND
In this paper, I argue that the communicative failures nonnative speakers are prone to experience in speech production can morally wrong them in their capacity as speakers. I call this kind of wrongful communicative failure ‘muffling’. Unlike similar wrongful communicative failures that are identified by feminist philosophers of language that occur at the hearer’s end, muffling involves communicative failures that occur at the speaker’s end. By conceptualizing muffling, I aim to enhance our understanding of the pervasive and unjust communicative restrictions experienced by nonnative speakers of dominant languages or vernaculars and therefore add to the list of concerns that linguistic justice scholars need to take into account.
Keywords: communicative curtailment, epistemic injustice, illocutionary silencing, linguistic injustice, nonnative speaking
1. Epistemic Challenges Faced by Non-native English Speakers in Philosophy: Evidence from an International Survey.
2025. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Peters, U. (first author), Çimendereli, Y. Ç., Davies, A., Gauvry, C., Inarimori, K., Klieber, A., Liu, S., Nottelmann, N., Russo, F., & Santos-Castro, J.
This paper is based on an international survey of academic philosophers (N= 1,615) comparing the effect of native and nonnative English speaking in navigating some of the essential academic tasks such as reading, writing, and preparing presentations.
Keywords: epistemic challenges, non-native English speakers, philosophy
Under-review
Paper title redacted
A paper on social ontology of nonnative speaker
Political theorists and philosophers working on linguistic justice frequently use the concept of (non)native speaker in order to designate their subject-matter while some linguists and English Language Teaching (ELT) scholars have recently contested the use of the concept. Even though this is an ongoing debate about what I call ‘eliminativism about the concept of (non)native speaker’ one may worry that the lack of a similar debate among the scholars of linguistic justice indicates that they are lagging behind and falling short in terms of interdisciplinarity. This worry may falsely lead to the conclusion that the entire debate in linguistic justice, built around the native and nonnative speaker dichotomy, is flawed, useless, and maybe even harmful for the victims of linguistic injustice. In this paper, I address this potential worry and argue that (non)native speaker is a necessary and useful concept for discussing various injustices. Drawing from similar discussions in social metaphysics, I offer a defense of the concept of (non)native speaker which answers the needs of linguistic justice theories despite some worries partially raised by linguistics and ELT scholars.
Work-in-progress
Inner Speech and Linguistic Justice
What are the extra-communicative restrictions one may experience as they think in a language in which they are not fully competent? When we think of the role of language in thought, the first line of inquiry that comes to mind is what is called linguistic determinism – the view that the syntactic or semantic structure of a language shapes what can be thought in these languages. But there is another sense in which language shapes thought that needs to be distinguished from the linguistic determinism debate. That is the way in which one’s personal linguistic resources afford certain thoughts in certain languages depending on the expertise one has in that language. Some recent work in feminist philosophy has explored this aspect of language, although not strictly as ‘linguistic’ resources but rather as ‘hermeneutical’ resources, which involves both linguistic and epistemic resources. As it is argued, when it comes to epistemic action, for example, the availability of certain concepts and linguistic items in the agent’s repertoire facilitate or inhibit thinking certain thoughts. I show that once we break from the monolinguistic assumptions about linguistic mental life, we begin to better understand what it is to navigate the world as a multilingual with varying degrees of linguistic competence. Drawing from recent debates on inner speech in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, I identify potential epistemic harms that linguistic agents experience as they think in a language with which they are not at ease. I argue that what I call cognitive noise, an unproductive effort generated by restricted articulation, takes away from an agent’s attentional resources and thereby prevents them from achieving certain epistemic goods that are otherwise available through inner speech.
An Existentialist Account of Nonnative Speaking
In addition to communicative and extra-communicative functions of language, I identify a new dimension of linguistic agency, which involves our intimate relationship with particular linguistic items we choose to use. This dimension does not necessarily translate as a success condition for our linguistic actions, as it is merely stylistic. It captures the difference between uttering P and Q, even when P and Q have the exact same meanings in that context. And yet, I argue, it is a crucial dimension of linguistic agency for feeling authentic as a linguistic agent. Drawing from recent work in analytic philosophy on agential identity, as well as 20th century existentialist accounts of authenticity, I offer the first account to explain the agential value of being able to develop a linguistic character and manifest it as one navigates the world. I explain that one tragedy of the nonnative speaker is that their relationship with language is often reduced to functionality, lacking the means to manifest a linguistic character in their use of language, and feeling constantly alienated from their utterances.
An Existentialist Response to Babel Fish
I respond to a common objection that linguistic justice scholars often hear. Why does this all matter given that soon we will have instantaneous translation thanks to the rapid development of technology? After articulating various iterations of the objection, I show that the most radical form of the objection can only be answered with the adoption of my account of linguistic agency. This is because the technology to think in one language and speak in another may allow us to overcome communication and identity-related injustices, but alienation from our own utterances will then become a universal problem for all.
Here is an essay where I discuss a shorter version of the argument.

